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Abstract: Academic reviews have highlighted the problem of lack of clarity with Nigerian anti-
bribery laws. It is important for the criminal law to clearly state the mental element of bribery. This 
would communicate to citizens, lawyers and judges what is wrong with bribery. It would also provide 
a yardstick to distinguish between the socio-cultural practice of gift-giving and bribery. This article 
analyses the mental element of bribery in Nigeria and federal anti-bribery laws in United States of 
America. The analysis is undertaken with a view to drawing useful insight to propose reform of 
Nigerian anti-bribery laws. The article finds that American laws better clarifies the wrongful mental 
conduct that transforms gift-giving into bribery. Unlike Nigerian statutes that uses the undefined word 
“corruptly” to capture the mental element of bribery, American statutes while using the word 
“corruptly” further captures the mental element of bribery in terms of intention to use a bribe to 
influence official action. The American approach if adopted by the legislature to reform Nigerian 
anti-bribery laws would provide better guidance to the courts, lawyers and laymen in understanding 
why the law criminalises bribery. It would also provide a platform to distinguish between gift-giving 
and bribery.  
Keywords: bribery; mental element; gratuity; gift-giving 
 
1. Introduction  
There is global recognition that bribery is morally and legally wrong. Transactions 
that give rise to bribery are often similar to the socio-cultural practice of showing 
appreciation through gift-giving. Gifts are traditional forms of expressing 
appreciation in Nigeria (Azenabor, 2007, p. 23). Bribery and gift-giving involve an 
exchange of benefit between two or more persons. This makes it imperative to 
differentiate between the two and clearly articulate the underlying mental element 
which determines when gift-giving transforms into bribery.  
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Corruption is a national problem in Nigeria (Osipitan & Oyewo, 1997, p. 257). 
Bribery is one of the major manifestations of corruption in Nigeria (Iarossi & 
Clarke, 2011, p. xi). Several anti-bribery laws have been enacted to address the 
problem. These laws provide punishment of imprisonment for bribery. The 
imposition of punishment is designed to achieve several objectives including 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and the educative function (Okonkwo, 1992, p. 37). The 
law can provide meaningful guidance and deter crime if the wrongfulness of the 
conduct is captured by the mental elements of the offence. Thus, the attainment of 
the educative objective of anti-bribery laws will depend largely on the extent to 
which the laws clearly communicate the wrongfulness in bribery and make the 
“people come to see that it is wrong” (Okonkwo, 1992, p. 37). Clarity would also 
make the work of prosecutors and judges involved in trying cases of bribery less 
complicated.  
It is against this background that this article examines the definition of the mental 
element of bribery under anti-bribery laws in Nigeria. The physical element of 
bribery is usually defined simply in terms of giving or receiving money or any 
other benefit or advantage in official transactions. The problematic aspect of 
bribery is determining with clarity the prohibited state of mind. In other words 
what makes the giving or receiving of money or any other benefit unconscionable 
in the eyes of the law as to constitute bribery?  
The first part of the paper is the introduction. The second part examines the mental 
element of bribery under anti-bribery laws in Nigeria. The third part examines the 
mental element of bribery under Federal anti-bribery laws in the United States of 
America (US) with a view to exploring whether useful insights can be gained to 
strengthen anti-bribery laws in Nigeria. Federal anti-bribery laws in the US have 
been chosen because of the similarity between the provisions of anti-bribery 
statutes in US and Nigeria The fourth part identify insight from US Federal anti-
bribery laws that can be utilised as basis to strengthen the definition of bribery in 
Nigeria. Part five is the conclusion of the article. 
 
2. Mental Element of Bribery in Nigeria  
This part examines the mental element of bribery under the Criminal Code, the 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act ( Cap. C3 laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria 2010 hereafter “ ICPC Act”), the Lagos Law and the Penal Code. 
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2.1. Criminal Code, ICPC Act and Lagos Law 
Sections 98, 98A and 98B of the Criminal Code Schedule to the Criminal Code 
Act
1
 prohibit bribery involving public officers and section 494 prohibits corrupt 
acceptance of gifts by agents. Section 98 covers the demand side of the offence 
involving a public official. Section 98A covers the supply side where any person 
offers a bribe to a public official. Section 98B covers any person soliciting or 
demanding a bribe on account of any action of public officers.  
The actus reus of the demand side of bribery is constituted when a public officers: 
“asks for, receives or obtains any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any 
other person;”2 or “agrees or attempts to receive or obtain any property or benefit 
of any kind for himself or any other person.”3 
The actus reus of the supply side of bribery is constituted when any person: “gives, 
confers or procures any property or benefit of any kind to, or for a public 
official…or to, on or for other person;”4 or promises or offers to give or confer or 
to procure or attempt to procure any property or benefit of any kind to, on or for a 
public official or to, on or for any person.”5 
The physical element of the demand side of bribery can be summed up in the 
words “asking for or receiving a benefit,” while that of the supply side can be 
summed as “giving or promising a benefit.” The mental element of the demand 
side of bribery is “corruptly” asking for or receiving a benefit on account of: 
- anything already done or omitted, or any favour or disfavor already shown 
to any person, by the public officer in the discharge of official duties or in 
relation to any matter connected with the functions, affairs or business of a 
Government department, public body or other organisation or institution in 
which the officer is serving;
6
 
- anything to be afterwards done or omitted, or any favour or disfavor to be 
afterwards shown to any person, by a public officer in the discharge of 
official duties.
7
 
                                                        
1Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2010, Cap C38. 
2S. 98(1)(a). 
3S. 98(1)(b). 
4S. 98A(1)(a). 
5S. 98A(2) (b). 
6S. 98(1)(a)(b)(i).  
7S. 98(1)(a)(b)(ii). 
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The mental element of the supply side of bribery is “corruptly” giving or promising 
a benefit on account of any act, omission, favour or disfavor on the part of the 
public official as is mentioned in section 98(1)(i) or (ii). 
A critical component of the mental element of bribery in the provisions outlined 
above is that the “asking for or receiving a benefit” or “giving or promising a 
benefit” must be done “corruptly.” In other words, the mental element of bribery is 
not complete if the benefit was conferred on account of the objects specified in 
sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) above without proving that it was done “corruptly.” If 
the meaning of “corruptly” is so central to the mental element of the offence, one 
wonders why it is not defined in the Criminal Code. This is a major flaw in the 
Code because “corruptly” is not a word of art or a word which has acquired any 
settled meaning.  
An attempt was made by Bairamian J to explain the meaning of “corruptly” in 
Biobaku v Police.
1
 His lordship rejected a suggestion that “corruptly” means 
improperly. His lordship explained the essence of “corruptly” as follows: “The 
notion behind s. 98 is this in my view: an officer in the public service is expected to 
carry out his duties honestly and impartially, and this he cannot do if he is affected 
by considerations of benefit for himself or another person; and the mischief aimed 
at in s. 98 is the receiving or the offering of some benefits as a reward or 
inducement to sway or deflect the officer from the honest and impartial discharge 
of his duties- in other words as a bribe for corruption or its price.”2 
The attempt to ascribe a meaning to the term “corruptly” by Bairamian J is 
commendable because, beyond the vague term “corruptly” he sought to articulate 
the policy underlying the criminalisation of receipt of benefit by a public officer in 
relation to his official duties. A bribe according to Bairamian J’s formulation is 
criminalised because of its tendency to cause a public officer not to meet up to the 
standard of honesty and impartiality required in the discharge of his duties. 
Bairamian J’s effort has been described as “more descriptive than definitive or 
conceptual,” and the legal definition of bribery as “archaic and pedestrian.” 
(Owasanoye, 2001, pp. 591 and 592). The provisions of the Criminal Code have 
also been described as “far from clear,” (Okonkwo, 1992, p. 355) complex and 
“difficult for both prosecutors and judges alike to interpret and apply.” (Akinseye-
George, 2000, p. 47) 
                                                        
1 (1951) 20 NLR 30. 
2Ibid,p. 31.  
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The writer submits that what constitutes “corruptly” should be clearly set out in 
any law prohibiting bribery. The criminal law should clearly set out the conduct 
that it seeks to prohibit. The writer agrees with the view that: “…offence of bribery 
must be expressed as simply and as clearly as possible so that it can readily be 
understood by people (and by their legal advisers) concerned about whether their 
conduct is lawful.”1 
The enactment of the ICPC Act in 2000 to specifically deal with the problem of 
corruption provided a unique opportunity to improve on the provisions of the 
Criminal Code and set out clearly the mental element of bribery. The ICPC Act has 
been described as the most comprehensively drafted and well-crafted piece of anti-
corruption legislation in the history of Nigeria.(Ocheje, 2001, pp. 177 and 179). 
While the writer share the view that the Act is the most comprehensive, the writer 
disagree with the view that it is a well-crafted piece of legislation. The ICPC Act 
does not clearly specify the mental element of bribery offences. The ICPC Act, still 
retained the antiquated word “corruptly” in the definition of bribery. The mental 
element of the main bribery offences in sections 8 and 9 is denoted by the word 
“corruptly,” The only change made to the provisions of section 98 and 98A of the 
Criminal Code by sections 8 and 9 of the ICPC Act is to replace the phrase “Any 
public official” with the phrase “Any person.” The ICPC Act did not make any 
improvement clearly specifying the mental element of bribery.  
The Criminal Law of Lagos State (Law No. 11 of 2011 hereafter “Lagos Law”) 
improved on the provisions of the Criminal Code on bribery by deleting the word 
“corruptly” from the definition of bribery.2 The Lagos Law however does not 
contain any provisions clearly specifying the mental element in the offence of 
bribery. While the deletion of the word ‘corruptly’ is commendable, the Lagos Law 
does not go far enough because it still leaves undefined the mental element in the 
offence of bribery. Furthermore, the draftsman of the Lagos Law did not make any 
significant effort to simplify the definition of bribery. The definition of the offence 
in section 63 of the Lagos Law is still substantially similar to section 98 of the 
Criminal Code.  
Another important issue in relation to the offence of bribery under the Criminal 
Code is the provision of section 99 which sought to draw a distinction between 
bribery and what under US Federal anti-bribery law is the offence of illegal 
                                                        
1United Kingdom Law Commission, Consultation Paper, “Reforming Bribery: A Consultation Paper” 
CP 185, p. 8, para. 1.29. 
2Ss. 63 and 64.  
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gratuity. Section 99 provides that: “Any person who, being employed in the public 
service, takes or accepts fromany person, for the performance of his duty as such 
officer, any reward beyond his proper pay and emoluments, or any promise of such 
reward, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for three years.” 
The import of section 99 came up for interpretation in R v Ijeoma.
1
 The defendant 
was charged under sections 98(1) and 99 of the Criminal Code. The evidence 
established that the defendant, an Acting Assistant Superintendent of Policed 
demanded and received some money from the complainant before releasing the 
police extract report of an accident in which the complainant’s motor vehicle was 
involved. It was established that it was the duty of the defendant as a Superior 
Police Officer to approve the release of the report. The court held that since the 
defendant received the money for the purpose of carrying out his duty and not for 
the purpose of any corrupt or improper act in the actual discharge of his duty, he 
could only be guilty under section 99 and not under section 98. In essence, the 
section established an offence similar to the offence of illegal gratuity under US 
Federal anti-bribery law (discussed in paragraph 3.1). The offence under section 99 
and illegal gratuity is perceived as a lesser offence because there is no intent on the 
part of the public officer to improperly perform his duties. It also follows that there 
is no intent on the part of the giver to improperly influence the public officer to 
perform his duties otherwise the giver would also have been liable under section 
98. Perceived in this manner the distinction theoretically appears well founded and 
justifies a punishment of imprisonment for three years compared to seven years 
under section 98.  
The big question however is whether there is any policy consideration that supports 
the retention of that distinction. The reason why the law prohibits gifts to public 
officers in the first place is the gift’s potential to influence the public officer in the 
performance of his official duty. Without the making of a gift the potential harm is 
avoided. The effect of paying or rewarding a public officer for his official duty is 
equally as damaging as when the gift was made initially with the intention to 
influence the officer. The perception of any observer with information that the 
officer received a reward for the performance of his duty would probably be that he 
was influenced in the discharge of his duty. Influence and the perception of 
influence as a result of a reward for official action beyond proper pay and 
emoluments therefore deserves equal treatment and punishment. Having regard to 
                                                        
1(1960) WRNLR 130. 
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the preceding policy consideration, the writer submits that the provision of section 
99 which creates the offence known as illegal gratuity in US should no longer be 
part of the provisions of the Criminal Code. The writer notes that there is no replica 
of section 99 of the Criminal Code in the ICPC Act. It is also important to note that 
section 115 of the Penal Code does not distinguish between bribery and illegal 
gratuity.  
 
2.2. Penal Code 
Section 115 of the Penal Code criminalises public officers taking gratification in 
respect of official acts. The physical element of the offence is accepting, obtaining 
or agreeing to accept or attempting to obtain “from any person for himself or for 
any other person, any gratification whether pecuniary or otherwise, other than 
lawful remuneration.” The mental element of the offence is that the gratification is 
the motive or reward for:  
a) doing or forbearing to do any official act; 
b) showing or forbearing to show in the exercise of his official functions 
favour or disfavor to any person; 
c) rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person 
with any department of the public service or with any public servant.
1
 
Before examining the scope of the three sub-paragraphs, the meaning of “motive” 
or “reward” will be examined. In State v Iornyagh2the court shed some light on the 
application and meaning of some aspect of section 115. The court quoted with 
approval the meaning of “reward” and “motive” as stated by Ratanlal thus: “The 
term ‘reward’ is manifestly intended to apply to a ‘past service.’ What is forbidden 
generally is the receiving of any gratification “as a motive “to do “or reward” for 
having done any such thing as is described in the definition.” (p. 407). 
The court also quoted with approval Gledhill explanation of the meaning of 
“motive” and “reward” as follows: “Motive implies that the gratification is given in 
anticipation of favour to be shown subsequently, ‘reward’ that it is given in 
consideration of a favour already bestowed but the bribe must be given in 
consideration of some official act.” (p. 407).  
                                                        
1Penal Code, s. 115(a)(b)(c). 
2(1979) 3 LRN 403. 
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The first leg of the mental element of the offence under section 115 is “doing or 
forbearing to do any official act.” Holden J held in Queen v.Bokkos1 that the gist of 
the offence is a public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in 
respect of an official act. The court added that it is not material to enquire what 
effect, if any, the bribe had on the mind of the receiver. Any payment “for doing 
……any official act” under section 115(a) qualifies as bribery. In this respect the 
Penal Code does not draw any distinction between bribery which is designed to 
influence official conduct and gratuity which is merely a reward for performing 
official action. The liability of the public officer in section 115(a) attaches once 
there is proof that gratification is the motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do 
any official act.  
The second part of the first leg of the mental under section 115 (a) covers 
“…forbearing to do any official act.” Where the official receives gratification as a 
motive or reward for not performing an official act an offence is committed. In 
Queen v. Bokkos the defendant (a bandsman in the Police force) who received 
money from a suspect as a motive for refraining from arresting and prosecuting a 
confessed thief was convicted under section 115. In the words of the court, what 
the defendant “forbore to do, namely arrest a confessed thief, was an official act.” 
(p. 485). 
The second leg of the mental element of bribery under the Penal Code is the 
defendant’s receipt of gratification as a motive or reward “for showing or 
forbearing to show in the exercise of his official functions favour or disfavor to any 
person.”  
The other part of the second leg which prohibits “forbearing to show … disfavor” 
is problematic. In State v Iornyagh (1979, 3 LRN 403).the court held that 
forbearance as an element of the offence refers to a situation where the accused 
takes gratification with the purpose of preventing or stopping a thing being done or 
omitted which ought to be done or omitted in the capacity of an official action. In 
this context it would appear absurd to say that the official forebore to show favour, 
because an official is not supposed to show favour in the discharge of official duty. 
Similarly, it is also absurd to suggest that an official forbeore to show disfavor. An 
official in not employed to show disfavor in the performance of official duty. It is 
not therefore surprising that it was held in State v Iornyagh that on the facts of the 
case “forbearing to show… favour” is inapposite and illogical. The accused a 
                                                        
1(1963) All NLR 482. 
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public servant, was charged with accepting gratification as a reward for “ 
forbearing to show in the exercise of your official functions favour,” contrary to 
section 115 of the Penal Code, in respect of N10 alleged to have been handed to 
him in anticipation of a favour.  
The problem associated with the use of the words “forbearing to show… favour” 
could have been solved if the provisions of section 115(b) had replicated the 
wordings of Section 116(b) of the Penal Code. Section 116 covers any person who 
accepts or attempts to obtain gratification from any person as a motive or reward 
for inducing by corrupt or illegal means any public servant – 
a. to do or forbear to do any official act; 
b. in the exercise of the official functions of such public servant to show 
favour or disfavour to any person; 
c. to render or attempt to render any service or disservice to any person with 
any department of the public service or with any public servant as such. 
The above provisions is not directed at a public servant but any person who seeks 
to induce a public servant to do something by corrupt or illegal means (Richardson, 
1987, p. 95). The mental element of the offence under section 116 is similar to 
section 115 save that section 116(b) avoided the use of “forebearing” in relation to 
favour or disfavor. The metal element in section 116(b) is showing favour or 
disfavour. A public officer is expected to perform his official duties having regard 
to any laid down polices and rules governing the exercise of the functions of his 
office. Any favour or disfavour induced by gratification is a breach of duty. It is 
significant to note that although the word “corrupt” is used in section 116, an 
alternative phrase “illegal means” is provided as substitute. The word “illegal 
means” used as an alternative to “corrupt” could suggest that the word is meant to 
mean “improperly.” Besides the word “corrupt” does not play a cardinal role in 
construing the mental element of the provisions unlike the position under the 
Criminal Code.  
The third leg of the mental element of the offences under section 115(c) is that the 
public officer must have received gratification as a motive or reward for rendering 
or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person with any department 
of the public service or with any public servant. This provision appears wider than 
section 115(a). This provision would cover a public servant who obtains 
gratification to assist another person to process a claim or application for approval 
pending before a government department other than the department where the 
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public officer is ordinarily employed. It would also cover a public servant who 
accepts gratification to induce another public servant to take an action detrimental 
to the interest of any person who has an official matter pending before any 
department of the public service or with any public servant. This provision also 
focuses on the gratification received by the public officer, without clearly 
expressing what is wrong with the receipt or why the receipt is criminalised.  
 
3. Mental Element of Bribery under US Federal Anti-Bribery Law 
Federal US statutes criminalising bribery directly
1
are section 201 of 18 U.S.C., 
(Bribery and Gratuity), section 78dd of 15 U.S.C. (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) 
and section 666 of 18 U.S.C. (Federal Program Bribery).  
3.1 Bribery and Gratuity  
Active bribery by a public official is an offence under section 201(b)(1) of 18 
U.S.C. The offence is defined as follows: “Whoever - directly or indirectly, 
corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official or 
person who has been selected to be a public official, or offers or promises any 
public official or any person who has been selected to be a public official to give 
anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent to:  
- to influence any official act; 
- to influence such public official or person who has been selected to be a 
public official to commit or aid in committing, or collude in, or allow, any 
fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United 
States; 
- to induce such public official or such person who has been selected to be a 
public official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of 
such official.” 
The offence of passive bribery by a public official is defined in section 201(b)(2) as 
follows: “Whoever-being a public official or person selected to be a public official, 
directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to 
receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in 
return for: (A)being influenced in the performance of any official act; (B)being 
                                                        
1There are other statutes which punishes other conducts which are not defined as bribery but which 
have been interpreted by the courts in a way to cover conducts often identified as bribery. The statutes 
are section 1951 of 18 U.S.C. (Hobbs Act) and sections 1341, 1343 and 1346 of 18 U.S.C., (Honest 
Services or Intangible Rights Fraud). 
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influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or 
make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or 
(C)being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of such 
official or person.” 
The elements of the offence are: (i) a public official; (ii) a corrupt intent; (iii) 
something of value accruing to the benefit of the public official; (iv) a relationship 
between the valuable article and the official act; and (v) an intent to influence or be 
influenced (Welch, 1989, p. 1358). The aspect of the statute that relates to the 
mental element of bribery is elements numbers (ii) and (iv). The word “corruptly” 
is not defined in the statute.  
The courts have adopted two approaches to construing the mental element of 
bribery. One approach is to construe the word “corruptly” in conjunction with the 
requirement of intent to influence or be influenced. In United States v. Zacher
1
 the 
court held that the evil sought to be prevented by the deterrent effect of section 
201(b) of 18 U.S.C. is the aftermath suffered by the public when an official is 
corrupted and thereby perfidiously fails to perform his public service and duty. 
Similarly, the court held in United States v. Rooney
2
 that a fundamental component 
of a “corrupt” act is “breach of some official duty owed to the government or the 
public at large.”3 The court went on to explain the essence of bribery as an attempt 
to influence another to disregard his duty while continuing to appear devoted to it 
or to repay trust with disloyalty. The court stated further that: “It is an obvious 
violation of duty and public trust for a public officer or some other person 
responsible for parcelling out public benefits to accept or demand a personal 
benefit intending to be improperly influenced in one’s official duties.” (p. 853) 
The court introduced the perspective that the influence exerted or sought to be 
exerted must be “improper”. This perspective is also echoed in the US Senate 
Report on the FCPA. The Report defined the word “corruptly” as connoting “evil 
motive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient. It does not 
require that the act be fully consummated, or succeed in producing the desired 
outcome.”4 
                                                        
1586 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir.1978).  
237 F.3d 847 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
3Ibid, at p. 852. The Court was interpreting the word “corruptly” used in section 666 of 18U.S.C. 
which prohibits bribery involving programs funded by the US Federal Government containing 
provisions similar to section 201 of 18 USC. 
4S. Rep. No. 95 -114 at p. 10 (1977).  
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The second approach is to construe the requirement of intent to influence or be 
influenced as if the element of “corruptly” is subsumed therein. In United States v. 
Traitz
1
 the court held that the statute required that the alleged briber offer the bribe 
with a “corrupt” intent” to influence official conduct. This according to the court 
requires the government to show that the money was knowingly offered to an 
official with intent and expectation that, in exchange for the money, some act of a 
public official would be influenced. A similar approach was adopted by the court in 
United States v Donathan
2
 when the court held that the “defendant acted corruptly; 
that is, with the intent of being influenced in her testimony” under section 
201(b)(4) requiring that a witness act “corruptly.” In United States v Sun-Diamond 
Growers of California
3
the US Supreme Court defined the mental element of 
bribery under the statute as follows: “Bribery requires intent “to influence” an 
official act or “to be influenced” in an official act, while illegal gratuity requires 
only that the gratuity be given or accepted “for or because of” an official act. In 
other words, for bribery there must be a quid pro quo— a specific intent to give or 
receive something of value in exchange for an official act.”4 
The requirement of quid pro quo need not be explicit. It may be implicit where the 
official accepted payments or other consideration with the implied understanding 
that he would perform or not perform an act in his official capacity.
5
 
In construing the bribery provisions the Supreme Court construed the meaning of 
the word “corruptly” in relation to the requirement of intent to influence or be 
influenced.
6
 It appears therefore that rather than seeking to construe the meaning of 
“corruptly” the courts have used the provisions of the statute relating to the intent 
to influence or be influenced to fill whatever gap might have been left in the law by 
the failure of the legislature to define the term “corruptly.” This approach is 
supported by Klein who argues that ‘corrupt intent’ is the intent to receive a 
specific benefit in return for a payment. (Klein, 1999, p. 128) 
Another aspect of section 201 of 18 U.S.C. that has created some problems is 
found in the provision of the law relating to illegal gratuity. Section 201(c) creates 
                                                        
1871 F.2d 368 (3dCir. 1989). 
265 F.3d 537, 540 (6th Cir. 1995). 
3526 U.S. 398, (1999). 
4Justice Scalia, Ibid, at p.1406.  
5United States v Kemp 500 F. 3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007).  
6In United States v. Ozcelik527 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2008) the court identified the corrupt purposes under 
section 201(b)(2) in terms of the purposes set forth in subsections (A) through (C). 
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the offence of illegal gratuity as follows: “Whoever - otherwise than as provided by 
law for the proper discharge of official duty: 
a. directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public 
official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or 
because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public 
official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official;”1 
b. being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public 
official, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official 
duty directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to 
receive or accept anything of value personally for or because of any official 
act performed or to be performed by such official or person.”2 
The problem with the provisions on illegal gratuity and bribery arises from the fact 
that the elements of the two offences are similar. The only difference relates to the 
fact that there is no requirement of “corruptly” and the intent to influence or be 
influenced. Illegal gratuity is giving anything of value to a federal public official 
for or because of an official act (Welling, 2013, p. 404). In United States v Sun-
Diamond Growers of California the Supreme Court noted a distinguishing feature 
of illegal gratuity as follows: “An illegal gratuity, on the other hand, may constitute 
merely a reward for some future act that the public official will take (and may 
already have determined to take), or for a past act that he has already taken.”3 
While bribery requires that there must be intent to influence an official or that the 
official intends to be influenced, illegal gratuity only involves a reward for some 
future act that the public official will take or for past act already taken. It may be 
easier to draw a distinction between bribery and illegal gratuity where the bribe is 
given as a reward after the performance of the official act. In relation to future acts 
of the public official, the Supreme Court held in Sun-Diamond Growers of 
California that a forward-looking gratuity is a gift to a public official for a future 
act that the public official may already have determined to take. The Supreme 
Court held that to establish a violation of section 201(c)(1)(A) the Government 
must prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a federal official and a 
specific “official act” for or because of which it was given. The court rejected 
Government's contention that section 201(c)(1)(A) is satisfied merely by a showing 
that respondent gave Secretary Espy a gratuity because of his official position. The 
                                                        
1 S. 201(c)(1)(A). 
2 S. 201(c)(1)(B). 
3526 U.S. 398, (1999), p. 404.  
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statute's insistence upon an “official act,”' the court noted seems pregnant with the 
requirement that some particular official act be identified and proved. The court 
reasoned that the Government's alternative reading would produce peculiar results, 
criminalising, e.g., token gifts to the President based on his official position and not 
linked to any identifiable act.  
The effort by the Supreme Court to draw a distinction between bribery and illegal 
gratuity is commendable and would probably work well in most situations. There 
are however, some problems arising from the Supreme Court’s decision. The first 
is in relation to forward looking gratuity. Where is the dividing line between 
forwarding looking gratuity and bribery? Where a gift is given to a public official 
in contemplation of a future official act and there is a link between a thing of value 
conferred upon a federal official and a specific “official act'' as required by the 
court, it becomes almost impossible to distinguish between this act and bribery. 
The problem is caused by the provisions of the statute. Illegal gratuities under the 
statue covers “any official act performed or to be performed”. If the statute had 
covered only “official act performed” the task of drawing a distinction between 
bribery and illegal gratuity would have been easier. The Court should be 
commended however for working within the statute to limit forwarding looking 
gratuity to a future act that the public official “may already have determined to 
take”. “Notwithstanding the efforts of the court to limit forward looking gratuity as 
fore stated, the writer agrees with the view that the precise scope of forward 
looking gratuity and the distinction between such a gratuity and a bribe remain 
somewhat murky even after the decision in Sun-Diamond (Klein, 1999, p. 132).” 
Consequently, it has been suggested that forward looking gratuity should be 
removed from the law and status based theory of liability that would allow liability 
for illegal gratuity to attach where a gift is given or received because of the 
officials position be inserted into the law. (Welling, 2013, p. 462) 
 
3.2 Federal Program Bribery 
Section 666 of 18 U.S.C. (Federal Program Bribery) extends the scope of federal 
bribery law beyond federal officials and witnesses to any program receiving 
benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal Program. The offence as defined in 
section 666(a)(1) (B) can be committed by a person being an agent of an 
organization, or of a state, local or Indian tribal Government or any agency who: 
“corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to 
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accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded 
in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such 
organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or 
more.” 
Section 666(a)(2) governs the supply side of the federal program bribery and it 
makes it an offence for a person being an agent of an organization, or of a state, 
local or Indian tribal Government or any agency who: “corruptly gives, offers, or 
agrees to give anything of value to any person, with intent to influence or reward 
an agent of an organization or of a State, local or Indian tribal government, or any 
agency thereof, in connection with any business, transaction, or series of 
transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of 
value of $5,000 or more.” 
The definition of the offence is similar to the offence of bribery under section 201 
of 18 U.S.C. Section 666 uses the word “corruptly” and also includes provision 
requiring that the bribe must be intended to influence or reward an agent of an 
organization, or of a state, local or Indian tribal Government or any agency. A 
literal reading of the provisions would suggest that it requires that the prosecution 
must establish a quid quo pro as in section 201 of 18 U.S.C. An examination of 
decided cases has however revealed a split between federal circuit courts requiring 
that the statute requires quid quo pro and those holding that it does not (Olen, 
2012, pp .229-261). While the Second, Fourth and Eight Circuits have held that 
quid quo pro is required,
1
 the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that 
quid quo pro is not required under the statute.
2
 The writer agrees with Olen’s 
submission that court’s must give effect to the plain language of section 666 and 
require that the prosecution must establish a quid quo pro. This is because the 
language of section 666 requires that there should be “connection” between the 
thing of value, intention to be influenced or rewarded and “any business, 
transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency.” 
The provisions of section 666 of 18 U.S.C. is similar to section 201 of 18 U.S.C. in 
terms of using the word “corruptly” and intent to influence official action as the 
mental element of bribery. 
  
                                                        
1United States v Ford, 435 F. 3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v Jennings 160 F.3d 1006, 
1021 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v Redzic, 627 F.3d 683, 692 (8th Cir. 2010).   
2United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 520 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 
1190 (7th Cir. 1997); and United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2005).  
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3.3. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Section 78dd of 15 U.S.C. (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act hereafter “FCPA”) 
provides for three anti-bribery offences with respect to any issuer,
1
 any domestic 
concern,
2
 and foreign nationals or businesses.
3
 The bribery offences are committed 
when anything of value is “corruptly” given or offered to a foreign official or 
foreign political party or official with the intent to:  
a. influence official decision or induce the foreign official or official of 
foreign political party to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful 
duty of such official; or secure an improper advantage; or 
b. induce the foreign official or official of foreign political party to use his 
influence with a foreign government or instrumentality to affect or 
influence any act or decision of the foreign government or instrumentality. 
Due to the similarity between the offences under section 78dd of 15 U.S.C. and 
section 201(b) of 18 U.S.C. it was held in StichtingTerBehartiging van de 
Belangen Van Quadaandeelhounders in Het Kapital Van Saybolt International 
B.V. v Schreiber
4
that Congress intended to incorporate within the FCPA the 
elements of the crime of bribery, which in essence is an “attempt to influence 
another to disregard his duty while continuing to appear devoted to it or to repay 
trust with disloyalty.” (pp. 182-183) 
In addition to using the nebulous word “corruptly” in the definition of the offence, 
the statute further introduced the exception of routine governmental action into the 
law which has the potential of blurring the distinction between what is a bribe and 
what is not a bribe. An amendment to the Act in 1988 exempts any facilitating or 
expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official the 
purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine 
governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party official.
5
 It is 
difficult in practice to separate facilitation payment from bribe. This is because “it 
blurs the distinction between legal and illegal payments” (Koch, 2005, p. 380). It is 
also likely that there is bound to be “inherent difficulties in determining when a 
payment …crosses the line from defendable minor payment to an actual bribe.” 
(Wilder & Ahrens, 2001, p. 583) 
                                                        
115 U.S.C s. 78dd-1(a). 
2 15 U.S.C. s. 78dd-2(a).  
3 15 U.S.C. s. 78dd-3(a).  
4 327 F. 3d 173 (2nd Cir 2003).  
5S. 78dd-1 (b). 
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4. Any Insights from US Anti-Bribery Laws? 
The examination of US Federal anti-bribery laws reveals that the undefined word 
“corruptly” also feature in the statutory definition of bribery. There is however a 
significant difference with respect to the use of the word “corruptly” in the legal 
definition of the mental element of bribery between Nigerian statutes and US 
statutes. In section 201(b)(1) of 18 U.S.C., section 666 of 18 U.S.C. and section 
78dd of 15 U.S.C. the use of the word “corruptly” is combined with another critical 
component of the mental element: viz intention to influence official conduct. The 
intent to influence official act was amplified to require a quid quo pro. As noted in 
the discussion of the decided cases, the courts have placed greater reliance on the 
mental element of intending to influence official action as the wrongful mental 
conduct in bribery. This approach and the phraseology of the mental element 
provisions in the US statutes is preferable to the convoluted wordings of the 
Nigerian statutes. The harm in bribery which the mental element of the offence 
should capture is the intention to use a gift or benefit to influence official conduct. 
A public official or any other employee should discharge official duty faithfully 
with regard to lay down rules and policies and should not be influenced in the 
discharge of official duty by considerations of personal benefit. 
The intention to use of a gift or benefit to influence official action is at the core of 
the offence of bribery. It will be easier to prove an intent to influence official action 
than an intent to prove that a gift or benefit is conferred on account of any favour 
or disfavour shown to any person as required by the section 98 of the Criminal 
Code or “showing or forbearing to show in the exercise of … official functions 
favour or disfavour” (section 115 of the Penal Code). The proof of intent to 
influence official action is a matter of fact which the court can infer from the 
evidence. While a gift of an inexpensive souvenir may not lead to an inference to 
use it to influence official conduct, the gift of an expensive Rolex wrist watch may 
lead to such inference. Re-phrasing the provisions of Nigerian anti-bribery statute 
in terms of the use of gift or benefit to influence official action simplifies the 
mental element of bribery. The simplification will provide better guidance to the 
courts, lawyers and laymen on the mental element of bribery and the distinction 
between a bribe and a gift.  
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5. Conclusion 
An attempt has been made in the article to examine the mental element of bribery 
under Nigerian anti-bribery statutes and US Federal anti-bribery laws. The 
examination of Nigerian statutes reveal the lack of clarity in the mental element of 
bribery and other problems associated with distinguishing between a bribe and 
gratuity. While the Penal Code avoids using the undefined word corruptly in the 
main offence of bribery under section 115, other problems associated with the 
mental element of bribery under the Penal Code were identified. The approach of 
defining the mental element of bribery under US statutes in terms of using a gift or 
benefit to influence official conduct provides in the writer’s view a good platform 
to reform anti-bribery statutes in Nigeria.  
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